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Abstract
We examine the impact of the values respect for others and responsibility on pro-
ductivity and the accumulation of physical and human capital for a sample of 58
countries. We ﬁnd that these two core values are important and that their impact is
substantial. Respect for others works primarily through productivity whereas respon-
sibility is important to investment in physical and human capital. We also show that
respect and responsibility are embedded in institutions and may overcome the negative
macroeconomic eﬀects associated with fractionalized societies.
1 Introduction
In an inﬂuential paper, Hall and Jones (1999) argue that the enormous variation in output
per worker across countries is driven by diﬀerences in social infrastructure. They show
that countries with stronger anti-diversion policies and institutions achieve higher levels
of investment in human and physical capital, greater productivity, and higher levels of
output per worker. In a similar vein, Acemoglu et al. (2001) identify colonial origins as
the deep determinant that has shaped institutions and government policies and therefore
explains diﬀerences in standards of living today. Mauro (1995) sees corruption, due to
ethnic division, as responsible for the lack of development. Knack and Keefer (1997) claim
that trust and civic norms are important determinants of output per capita and investment.
∗corresponding author. boucher@moore.sc.edu
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The link from culture to trust to economic performance is established by Guiso et al. (2009)
in their analysis of European trade and capital ﬂows.
Each of these papers drills down into the sources of economic growth. Our work goes
a step further and considers the role of two personal virtues or values: respect for others
and responsibility. To date, the literature on economic growth has been largely silent on
the role of values. There are exceptions. Tabellini (2008b), building on the work of Bisin
and Verdier (2001), constructs a model of parent-child transmission of values and uses it
to explain the persistence of economic institutions over centuries.1 In our view, individual
values are important because they determine the basis for how a person relates to others.
Values therefore determine behavior one-on-one, in small groups, or in large, impersonal
organizations  all settings in which production occurs.
We see two channels through which respect for others and responsibility matter to
production. First, they may foster the accumulation of physical and human capital and
productivity through a desire to invest in education and new technologies. Second, these two
values may lie behind social capital, policies, and institutions. Because good institutions
curtail corruption and promote trust, they are associated with higher levels of investment
in physical and human capital. Respect for others and responsibility may inﬂuence the
structure of institutions that protect property and human rights, promote policies that
endeavor to improve the health and education of people, and naturally facilitate generalized
trust outside of family ties and clans. Cross-country diﬀerences in these two values may
fundamentally explain diﬀerences in productivity, capital intensity and human capital and
therefore output per worker around the world.2
We use data from the World Values Survey, 2006 to measure the values respect for
others and responsibility. We use this data, along with the Penn World Table v.6.2 (Heston
et al. (2006)), to investigate the impact of our two values on output per worker and its
three component parts  productivity, capital intensity, and human capital. In basic OLS
regressions, we see a pattern that persists through various speciﬁcations: respect for others
works primarily through productivity, while responsibility inﬂuences the accumulation of
physical capital and human capital. The eﬀects are large and signiﬁcant. The two values
together are statistically signiﬁcant in explaining 46% of the cross-country variation in
output per worker.
Trust is often considered an important determinant of economic outcomes. However,
in our tests, we ﬁnd no role for it once respect and responsibility are introduced. A corol-
1In his presidential address to the European Economic Association, Tabellini (2008a) called for more
research on how individual values inﬂuence institutional outcomes.
2President Obama made responsibility a centerpiece of his speech given to school children on September
8, 2009; see http://www.whitehouse.gov/MediaResources/PreparedSchoolRemarks.
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lary to our view is that where respect for others and responsibility are strong, ethnic and
religious fractionalization need not be associated with lower levels of capital accumulation
and productivity. A large body of work ﬁnds that societal divisions hurt economic per-
formance.3 Yet, these ﬁndings ignore values. It is possible that in societies where good
values are embraced, ethnic and religious divisions may not be negatively correlated with
economic progress. We ﬁnd that inclusion of core values eliminates the negative impact of
fractionalization on capital accumulation and productivity in many cases. In others, while
the negative eﬀect remains, the magnitude of the eﬀect is more than oﬀset by the positive
impact of core values.
We also investigate whether core values aﬀect the quality of institutions. Institutions
are human creations and so it is natural to suspect that they will embed values shared by
a society. We ﬁnd support for this idea, too. Respect for others and responsibility have
positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects on social infrastructure, civil liberties, property rights, and
economic freedom. We then backpedal and consider the possibility that values aﬀect capital
intensity, human capital, productivity, and output per worker only through institutions.
When we regress our production components on institutions, and instrument for institutions
with our two values, we ﬁnd institutions have a positive, statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect. Our
ﬁndings suggest an alternative interpretation to Hall and Jones (1999) claim that social
infrastructure is critical to production. Institutions may matter because fundamentally,
they capture the core values a society shares.
Lastly, we consider the possibility that other values that may be important to production
have been omitted from our analysis. We consider eight other values like hard work,
independence or determination and perseverance . When we include these other values
individually along with respect and responsibility, we ﬁnd the pattern established in the
OLS results remains. Respect for others is signiﬁcant in explaining productivity and output
per worker whereas responsibility is signiﬁcant in explaining physical and human capital
and output per worker.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we elaborate on the eﬀect of core values
on economic outcomes. In Section 3 we describe our data and its sources. In Section 4
we set out our empirical strategy and report results from OLS regressions with our values
as the main regressors. We then include trust in our speciﬁcations. Here we also explore
whether values can overcome negative eﬀects associated with fractionalization. In Section 5
we investigate how values shape institutions and consider whether values work only through
institutions. In Section 6, we test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of eight
other values. Section 7 concludes.
3See Easterly and Levine (1997), Alesina and Ferrara (2005), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).
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2 Core Values and Production
We call respect for others and responsibility core values because we believe they reﬂect
deeply-held beliefs that guide one's behavior. They cannot be altered in response to eco-
nomic incentives; they are exogenous. Core values act as a restraint on the rational eco-
nomic agent and are consistent with evidence of the existence of altruism, kindness, and
other puzzles to utility maximization pervasive in the literature on experimental economics,
ﬁnancial economics, sociology, and psychology.4
Our ﬁrst core value, respect for others, is a rough measure of how seriously people take
the Golden Rule. This code of conduct, prominent in nearly all religions and cultures,
encourages people to act honestly and fairly when dealing with others, regardless of social
distance. Individuals who respect others are more likely to be trustworthy in both produc-
tion and exchange. Trustworthy individuals prevent output losses associated with shirking
and cheating and thus enable output to be maximized. Trustworthiness also fosters trust,
which is necessary for the functioning of any modern economy. Respect for others is a
broad, generalized value that may also manifest as a desire to protect the rights of others
where there is no familial tie or other close relationship.
Our second core value, responsibility, is relationally more speciﬁc than respect for others.
To be responsible means to be ethically accountable for the care or welfare of oneself or
another  typically in instances where there is a deﬁned relationship. Whereas respect is
broad and is assumed to be conferred by one person to anyone, responsibility emerges in
relationships where there is likely to be a familial, school, or workplace tie. Responsibility
for oneself may be demonstrated as a willingness to invest in one's future by accumulating
human and physical capital. Responsibility for others assumes an individual fulﬁlls his or
her duties to others. In our view, individuals who are more responsible are more likely to
complete their tasks and participate more fully in production.
Our conception of the way that core values aﬀect output is shown in Figure 1. Core
values inﬂuence behavior directly, as described above, but also indirectly through the design
of institutions. Thus, we view values as the deep driver of productivity, input accumulation,
output per worker, and institutions through which behavior may be mediated. High-quality
institutions have been linked to greater living standards in the work of Hall and Jones
(1999), Easterly and Levine (1997), Temple and Johnson (1998), Alesina et al. (2003),
Guiso et al. (2004), and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), among other recent work. High-
quality insitutions minimize transactions costs, smooth the wheels of technology transfer,
4To the extent that core values generate positive externalities, aggregate utility and proﬁts may in fact
be greater than aggregate utility and proﬁts assuming rational economic agents.
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Figure 1: Relationships
promote innovation through well-deﬁned property rights, and secure investments in health
and education for large segments of society. All of these lead to more eﬃcient and productive
inputs to production.
Our work also oﬀers an explanation for the persistence in institutions and underdevel-
opment that is addressed by Rajan and Zingales (2006) and Acemoglu (2008) using models
of interest groups and the political process. Because core values are likely to be highly
persistent (Tabellini, 2008b), they may be able to explain the persistence of institutions.
Glaeser et al. (2004) ﬁnd that human capital is more essential for economic growth than
are good instituitons. Our work suggests that core values may raise human capital both
directly and through better education policies.
Finally, we see our core values, respect for others and responsibility, as distinct from
culture. It is our view that values may be shared by diverse cultures and do not deﬁne them.
While culture is commonly distinguished by ethnicity, linguisitics, or religious faith, core
values may span these cultural divides and indeed make them inconsequential in economic
exchange.
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3 Data
3.1 Values
The World Values Survey (2006), extensively used by researchers from many diﬀerent areas
of the social sciences, provides us with data pertaining to individuals' values. The number of
respondents varies across countries but typically ranges from 1,000-1,300. We use responses
from the 1995 (Wave 3) and 2000 (Wave 4) editions. Where there are duplicate countries
across Waves 3 and 4, we use data from the most recent wave only. We select the following
survey question:
Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home.
Which, if any, do you feel to be especially important? Please choose up to ﬁve
(CODE FIVE ONLY).
The question is followed by a list of eleven qualities5 in order as:
good manners, independence, hard work, feeling of responsibility, imagination,
tolerance and respect for others, thrift saving money and things, determination
and perseverance, religious faith, unselﬁshness, and obedience.
We select response rates to tolerance and respect for others (respect, for short) and feeling
of responsibility (responsibility, for short) to measure core values. Table 1 reports the
percentage of respondents selecting each of the core values for a sample of ﬁfteen countries.
We also report response rates averaged across OECD and non-OECD countries. There
are twenty-three OECD countries and thirty-ﬁve non-OECD countries. The full sample
average, standard deviation, and range are also reported. Appendix A presents the data
for each country in our sample.
In constructing the response rates, we had to correct for overresponses because some
respondents selected more than ﬁve values. To correct, we dropped individuals who selected
more than ﬁve values.6 Overall, we see that descriptive statistics on respect and responsi-
bility are similar. They each average about 70% and have standard deviations and ranges
that are similar. There is about an equal split between the ﬁfteen countries where respect
for others is higher than responsibility and vice-versa. However, a look at the correlation
between the two values in Table 2 shows it is quite low at 0.28.
5In the World Value Survey, the questions begin with A027 and end with A043. We select only those
qualities that were asked in Waves 3 or 4.
6Iran had the largest share of overresponders; 38% selected more than ﬁve values. For thirty-nine
countries, overresponse rates were less than 5%. There were three countries with no responders selecting
more than ﬁve values.
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Table 1: Data: Selected Countries and Groups
Country Respect Responsibility A kρ h y
United States 0.80 0.72 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Argentina 0.69 0.76 0.44 0.93 1.02 0.42
Canada 0.82 0.77 0.73 1.07 0.95 0.74
China 0.72 0.64 0.14 0.93 0.78 0.10
France 0.85 0.73 0.74 1.10 1.01 0.82
Germany 0.71 0.82 0.77 1.17 0.84 0.76
India 0.58 0.63 0.16 0.68 0.82 0.09
Ireland 0.75 0.52 1.22 0.90 0.80 0.88
Japan 0.71 0.91 0.61 1.30 0.84 0.66
Mexico 0.71 0.77 0.36 0.94 0.86 0.29
Russian Fed. 0.68 0.76 0.26 1.11 0.89 0.26
Singapore 0.69 0.81 0.72 1.24 0.99 0.88
Sweden 0.92 0.87 0.69 1.07 0.94 0.69
Uganda 0.56 0.55 0.14 0.36 0.65 0.03
United Kingdom 0.79 0.47 0.92 0.97 0.82 0.73
Average by Income Group
OECD 0.77 0.73 0.73 1.10 0.92 0.73
non-OECD 0.65 0.69 0.34 0.86 0.84 0.27
Entire Sample
Range .43-.92 .47-.92 .13-1.21 .36-1.29 .60-1.05 .03-1.0
Overall Average 0.70 0.72 0.50 0.96 0.87 0.45
Overall Std. Dev. 0.11 0.12 0.26 0.19 0.10 0.28
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3.2 The Components of Production
Output in each country is produced according to:
Y = Kα (AH)1−α (1)
where Y is total output, K is the capital stock, A is productivity, and H is total human
capital. As is standard, H = hL, where h is individual human capital and L is the number
of workers. Following Hall and Jones (1999), we express output per worker y ≡ YL as:
y = Akρh (2)
where k ≡ KY is the capital intensity and ρ ≡ α1−α .
We decompose output per worker into each of its components in (2). Our data for y
comes from the Penn World Table (Heston et al. (2006))  we use the RGDPWK series.
We construct our own capital series using the perpetual inventory method.7 To get capital
intensity, we divide our capital series by RGDPCH from the Penn World Table. For h, we
use the method of Hall and Jones (1999). They assume that the logarithm of h is related
to years of schooling in a piece-wise linear manner.8 Our data for years of schooling comes
from Barro and Lee (2001). Finally, we set α = .33, which is a standard value. Productivity
A is found as the residual once the other series in (2) have been constructed.
The last four columns of Table 1 show output per worker and the three components
in (2) for ﬁfteen selected countries and averages by the OECD indicator  relative to the
United States. Appendix A contains data for the full list of countries. The decomposition
updates estimates on these three components and output per worker reported in Hall and
Jones (1999). As in their work, we see substantial variation in output per worker across
countries. The variation appears most notably linked to large diﬀerences in productivity A
across the sample. The country with the highest productivity is Ireland and the country
with the lowest productivity is Uganda. Diﬀerences in kρ and h are most pronounced for
the low income countries.
In Table 2, we see the correlation between y and A (in logs) is 0.94 which is close to
7We constructed K in two steps. First, we found the initial capital stock: K0 =
Ia
g+δ
. In this expression,
Ia is the average of the ﬁrst four observations of investment in each country, g is technology growth and δ
is depreciation. We assume g = .02 and δ = .06 in all countries. Second, we applied the recursive formula
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It to ﬁll out later values of K. We use the earliest observation possible, which is 1960
in most cases.
8For 1 to 4 years, the return to schooling is 13.4 percent; for the next four, 10.1 percent; after that, it is
6.8%. These are average rates of return for, respectively, Sub-Saharan Africa, the world, and the OECD,
as measured by Psacharopoulos (1994).
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Table 2: Correlations
Respect for
others
Responsibility A kρ h y
Respect for
others
1
Responsibility 0.28 1
A 0.59 0.39 1
kρ 0.39 0.50 0.49 1
h 0.31 0.53 0.46 0.53 1
y 0.59 0.51 0.94 0.73 0.64 1
Correlations for A, kρ, h, and y use logs of each series.
the estimate of 0.89 in Hall and Jones (1999). Table 2 also shows that respect for others
and responsibility are positively correlated with our components of production, A, kρ, h,
and y. We turn next to an empirical examination of core values and the components of
production.
4 Empirical Strategy
Our basic model is based on Figure 1:
Zj = α0 + α1Respectj + α2Responj + α3Ij + εj (3)
where Zj represents the log of one of the following: Aj , k
ρ
j , hj , or yj . The variable Ij is
a measure of the quality of institutions. Our primary institutional measure is the Index
of Property Rights constructed as part of the Index of Economic Freedom by the Heritage
Foundation.9 Our theory suggests that values and institutions will be correlated, which
we will deal with in Section 5. For now, we may think of α1, α2 as capturing the direct
eﬀect of values on Z and α3 as capturing the indirect eﬀect of values on Z. Both values and
institutions exert an inﬂuence on outcomes through behavior, which is unobserved. Finally,
εj is the error term. We hypothesize that our parameters of interest α1, α2, α3 > 0.
4.1 Baseline Results
The ﬁrst set of results we present uses OLS to estimate (3) with and without the institutional
variable. These are reported in Table 3, panels A, B, C, and D. In the ﬁrst two columns
9Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) use this as one of their main measures of institutional quality.
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of each panel, we include either respect for others or responsibility separately. In the third
column, we include both. Column 4 of each panel includes the Property Rights measure.10
Table 3 reveals a pattern that we will see repeated throughout the paper: respect for
others works through productivity A, whereas responsibility works through the capital
intensity kρ and human capital h. Both values are highly signiﬁcantly related to output
per worker y.
Panel A reports the results for productivity. When respect for others or responsibility
is included alone, each core value is statistically signiﬁcant and positive across all speciﬁca-
tions. Responsibility loses signiﬁcance, however, when it is included with respect, without
or with the Property Rights measure. By itself, respect for others accounts for 34% of
the cross-country variation in productivity and rises substantially with the inclusion of the
Property Rights measure. We ﬁnd that for productivity, a 1% point increase in respect for
others corresponds to a rise in productivity between 1.5-2.9 percentage points.
Panel B reports the results for these same speciﬁcations for capital intensity.11 Without
the Property Rights measure, we see that respect for others and responsibility are positive
and signiﬁcant and jointly explain 29% of the cross-country variation in k. With the
inclusion of Property Rights, however, only responsibility retains signiﬁcance. Our estimates
suggest that a 1% point rise in responsibility will raise capital intensity by 0.72 percentage
points or more.
Panel C reports the results for human capital. Respect for others loses signiﬁcance when
responsibility is included. On the other hand, responsibility retains signiﬁcance across all
speciﬁcations. The overall explanatory power of responsibility alone is 27%. The result is
consistent with our hypothesis that an individual's decision to invest in human capital will
be positively correlated with the value they place on being responsible. However, the eﬀect
of core values on h is smaller than those reported for k or A. Countries with a responsibilty
score that is 1% point higher will see human capital 0.4-0.5 percentage points higher.
Our decomposition of y suggests that the eﬀect of values should stem from their separate
eﬀects on A, kρ, and h. Panel D reports the results for y. Looking across the speciﬁcations,
we see that these values have a positive, statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on output per worker,
with or without Property Rights. When both values are included, 46% of the variation in
cross-country output is explained. Inclusion of the Property Rights measure raises the
explanatory power to 67%. The overall eﬀect of these values is large. Without controls,
our results suggest that a 1% point increase in each of these values will collectively increase
10We also run speciﬁcations including six regional dummies or an OECD dummy. The pattern of results
is very similar.
11When we use the term capital intensity, we mean it to refer to kρ.
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output per worker by 6.1%. The inclusion of the Property Rights measure dampens the
eﬀect, but it still remains large at 3.3%.12
Overall, we ﬁnd strong empirical support that our two core values contribute positively
to production per worker. In nearly all cases, where one or both of the core values are
statistically signiﬁcant, we see levels of statistical signiﬁcance of 3% or higher. Moreover,
respect works through A while responsibility works through kρ and h.
4.2 Core Values and Trust
There has been much empirical work that examines the inﬂuence of trust on economic
outcomes (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; and Guiso et al., 2009 ). In
this subsection, we include the well-known trust question from the World Values Survey
(2006) as a control Xj in (3), to see if it adds anything to the determination of y or its
components. The question reads:
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be
very careful in dealing with people? 1. Most people can be trusted. and 2. Can't be too
careful.
The percentage of respondents selecting Most people can be trusted corresponds to our
measure of trust.
Table 4 reports the results where we now include trust and our two core values, with and
without the Property Rights measure. For each of these series, the empirical results diﬀer
little from those reported above. Trust has no impact on the components of production
or overall output per worker.13 Respect remains signiﬁcant for productivity and output
per worker. Responsibility remains signiﬁcant for capital intensity, human capital, and
productivity.
12Breuer and McDermott (2008) show that output per capita (not per worker) is closely related to respect
(which they label intrinsic trustworthiness). They do not however, consider responsibility or the separate
components of output.
13If we are willing to accept a 7% marginal signiﬁcance level, we see that trust has a negative and
signiﬁcant eﬀect on h when the OECD dummy is included. It is possible that in richer countries, the more
trusting an individual is in others (or the government), the less likely he or she is to make investments in
h. In other words, trust may mitigate the impact of responsibilty in countries where the social safety net
is likely to be larger. We see that a 1% point increase in responsibility raises human capital by 0.5% but
that trust reduces it by 0.15%.
12
Table 4: Trust and Core Values
Panel A: Dependent =A Panel B: Dependent = kρ
Trust 0.49 0.35 0.19 0.16
[0.25] [0.39] [0.24] [0.46]
Respect 2.70** 1.46* 0.52* 0.27
[0.00] [0.01] [0.03] [0.29]
Responsibility 1.04 0.09 0.79** 0.68*
[0.17] [0.85] [0.00] [0.01]
Property Rights 0.32** 0.05
[0.00] [0.11]
Constant 6.26** 6.62** -0.66* -0.60*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.03]
Observations 58 55 58 55
Adj. R2 0.39 0.61 0.3 0.31
Panel C: Dependent = h Panel D: Dependent = y
Trust -0.09 -0.13 0.59 0.38
[0.30] [0.17] [0.24] [0.52]
Respect 0.23+ 0.05 3.45** 1.77*
[0.08] [0.76] [0.00] [0.01]
Responsibility 0.52** 0.44** 2.35* 1.21*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.05]
Property Rights 0.05** 0.42**
[0.00] [0.00]
Constant 0.17 0.21+ 5.77** 6.22**
[0.19] [0.10] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 58 55 58 55
Adj R2 0.28 0.4 0.47 0.67
Notes: Robust p values in brackets. **signiﬁcant 1%; * at 5; + at 10%.
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4.3 Core Values and Societal Divisions
Empirical work by Mauro (1995), Easterly and Levine (1997), Alesina and Ferrara (2005),
and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) report that societies that are highly fractious or
polarized along ethnic or religious lines will be underperformers. Societal divisions may
bring civil conﬂict, corruption, mistrust, and oppression not experienced in more homo-
geneous societies. Therefore, it is unsurprising that countries where ethnic and religious
tensions ﬂame also see lower standards of living, education, investment, and productivity.14
We question whether respect for others and responsibility may ameliorate the negative in-
ﬂuences of societal divisions on physical and human capital accumulation, productivity,
and output per worker.
To test our idea, we investigate the eﬀect of ethnic fractionalization on A, kρ, h, and
y using data from Alesina et al. (2003). We ﬁrst regress our outcome variables on ethnic
fractionalization alone. These results are reported in the ﬁrst column of each of the panels
in Table 5. Ethnic fractionalization has a statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on A, kρ,
and y and on average explains about 14% of the cross-country variation in each. We also
investigate (but do not report) the inﬂuence of religious fractionalization, ethnic polariza-
tion, and religious polarization on our production components.15 Religious polarization
alone among these has a negative, statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on A, kρ, h, and y.
Next, we add our two core values alongside ethnic fractionalization. The results are
reported in the second column of each panel. Accounting for core values removes the
statistical signiﬁcance of ethnic fractionalization wherever it was signiﬁcant. At the same
time, the core value respect remains signiﬁcant for A and y; and responsibility remains
signiﬁcant for kρ and h. In the third column of each panel, we include the Property Rights
measure and obtain the same result. Ethnic fractionalization remains insigniﬁcant and the
core values reported in earlier tables remain signiﬁcant.
We ﬁnd, but do not report, similar results for religious polarization. However, despite
the inclusion of core values, religious polarization remains negative and statistically sig-
niﬁcant. However, the coeﬃcient estimate is smaller than the coeﬃcient estimate on the
(signiﬁcant) core value. The evidence is consistent with our idea that core values may
oﬀset, if not completely eliminate, the negative eﬀects of ethnic or religious divisions on
aspects of production.
14There is an alternative view. Fractionalized societies are more diverse and therefore more likely to bring
variety, imagination, and better problem solving to the production process. It is possible, therefore, that
fractionalized societies could achieve better economic growth rates. See Alesina et al. (2000), and Lazear
(1999).
15Polarization is a measure of societal division that reaches a maximum when there are two groups.
Fractionalization rises with the number of groups. See Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).
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5 Core Values, Institutions, and Production
5.1 Core Values and Institutions
One part of our hypothesis is that values are built into institutions. We expect that in
countries where respect for others and responsibility are pervasive, citizens are likely to
have established institutions that uphold these values. If true, then we should expect that
these core values also determine the quality of institutions. We test this idea using the
following speciﬁcation:
Ij = β0 + β1Respectj + β2Responj + νj (4)
We consider four diﬀerent indices of institutions:
 social infrastructure S
 index of economic freedom IEF
 property rights PR
 civil liberties CL
All of the indices are adjusted so that higher numbers correspond to better quality institu-
tions. We expect β1 and β2 > 0.
16
The data on S comes directly from Hall and Jones (1999). This is an average of GADP
(an index of government antidiversion policy from Political Risk Services) and the fraction
of years the country had been open (in the sense of Sachs and Warner, 1995) between 1950
and 1994. The GADP index includes measures of law and order and bureaucratic quality,
as well as the government's role in corruption, risk of expropriation, and repudiation of
contracts. The institutional measure IEF comes from the Heritage Foundation and is on
a four-point scale. This index is based on ﬁfty factors that cover ten equally-weighted
categories ranging from non-tariﬀ barriers to trade to labor market regulations and more.
The third institutional variable, the one used above, is PR, one of the ten sub-indices that
make up the IEF . Our last measure of institutions CL comes from Freedom House. Civil
liberties is a seven-point index that is based on freedom of expression and belief, association
and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights.
Table 6 reports the results of OLS regressions of (4). We see that both respect for
others and responsibility are uniformly signiﬁcant for all of the institutional measures. The
16Breuer and McDermott (2008) investigate the impact of intrinsic trustworthiness (which they measure
using the WVS question on respect for others) on PR and the variable constraint on the executive from
the Polity IV database. They ﬁnd it is positive and signiﬁcant.
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Table 6: Values Determine Institutions
S IEF PR CL
Respect 1.14** 2.79** 4.02** 6.37**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Responsibility 0.79** 1.54+ 2.84* 3.28*
[0.00] [0.10] [0.05] [0.04]
Constant -0.79** 0.16 -1.1 -1.52
[0.00] [0.77] [0.20] [0.20]
Obs. 56 55 55 58
Adj. R2 0.42 0.34 0.34 0.34
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust p values in brackets. **signiﬁcant 1%; * at 5%.
coeﬃcients are all positive, consistent with our claim that stronger core values will raise
the quality of institutions. The core values explain 34-42% of the cross-country variation
in institutions.
5.2 Institutions, Production, and Values as Instruments
In this section, we entertain the possibility that the eﬀects of values on A, kρ, h, and
y may work only through institutions. That is, in Figure 1, the linkage between values
and behavior may be absent, leaving only institutions as the channel through which values
matter. This means that we should replace (3) with:
Zj = a0 + a3Ij + j (5)
while retaining (4).
We maintain our assumption in this section that values are exogenous in the sense that
there is no reverse causality running from either Z or I back to respect and responsibility.
We do, however, allow for the possibility that there is simultaneous causality between Z
and I. In this case, there would some correlation between the error  and I in (5). This
is the hypothesis of much recent work, including Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al.
(2001), and Glaeser et al. (2004). To model this, we replace (4) with:
Ij = b0 + b1Respectj + b2Responj + b3Zj + uj (6)
Whether or not there is simultaneity between Z and I, we can legitimately estimate a
reduced form of the system (5) and (4)  or (6)  by regressing the outcomes Z on values
17
alone.
If there is no simultaneity, then this amounts to substituting (4) into (5) and regressing
Z on the two core values. In fact, we have already reported these results in Column 3 of
each panel in Table 3.17
If there is simultaneity between Z and I, so that (6) replaces (4), we estimate an
observationally equivalent reduced form. However, if we want to recover the structural
coeﬃcient a3, then we must use two stage least squares. In this case, our two core values
are legitimate instruments for resolving the endogeneity problem. Again, this relies on
our maintained hypothesis that core values are exogenous. We can regard the results in
Table 6 as the ﬁrst stages of four diﬀerent two-stage least squares regressions. We are, in
other words, replacing Hall and Jones' instruments  latitude and world language  with
our values variables respect and responsibility. The second stage results of this analysis are
reported in Table 7. No matter which institutional measure we use, all work extremely well
when instrumented with respect and responsibility in explaining the four outcome variables.
Signiﬁcance is better than 1% in all cases.
Finally, we ran over-identiﬁcation tests of the exogeneity of our values as instruments.
That test passed in the regressions of A, kρ, and y (that is, 12 of the 16 cases) but failed
in the equation for h, indicating that responsibility should be included directly in the
structural regression. That is, for h, (3) might be preferable to (5). We think this is
plausible, since human capital accumulation is the outcome that is most directly tied to
individual behavior. Responsibility appears to have a direct inﬂuence on human capital in
a way that, for example, respect may not have on productivity.18
6 Adding Other Values
Our focus so far has been on the two core values we believe to be fundamental to production.
A natural criticism of our work is that we may be omitting other values that might work just
as well as, or even better than, respect and responsibility. If these other values are correlated
with respect or responsibility, our earlier coeﬃcient estimates and standard errors may be
biased and our conclusions premature. If they are not correlated, (3) may be misspeciﬁed.
A second criticism is that our two key values may not be exogenous as we have main-
17The coeﬃcient estimates may be thought of as reduced form estimates pi1 and pi2. Dividing these by
βi from (4), reported in Table (6), gives
pii
βi
. These ratios are estimates of the same thing: the a3 coeﬃcient
on institutions from the OLS regression of (5).
18We also ran tests of endogeneity of the institutions in the primary estimating equation (5). In 12 of
16 cases, we accept endogeneity at the 5% level; and 15 out of 16 at the 10% level. The failures were not
conﬁned to the human capital equations.
18
Table 7: Institutions and Output: Two-Stage Least Squares
Institution _ Panel A: Dependent = A Panel B: Dependent = kρ
S 2.13** 0.78**
[0.00] [0.00]
IEF 0.94** 0.31**
[0.00] [0.00]
PR 0.59** 0.20**
[0.00] [0.00]
CL 0.43** 0.14**
[0.00] [0.00]
Constant 7.81** 6.81** 6.78** 6.01** -0.13 -0.44+ -0.43* -0.68*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.30] [0.08] [0.05] [0.04]
Obs. 56 55 58 55 56 55 58 55
Adj. R2 0.63 0.47 0.25 0.45 0.34 0.02  0.03
Panel C: Dependent = h Panel D: Dependent = y
S 0.36** 3.26**
[0.00] [0.00]
IEF 0.15** 1.40**
[0.00] [0.00]
PR 0.10** 0.89**
[0.00] [0.00]
CL 0.07** 0.64**
[0.00] [0.00]
Constant 0.48** 0.31** 0.33** 0.2 8.17** 5.53** 6.67** 6.68**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.19] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Obs. 56 55 58 55 56 55 58 55
Adj. R2 0.22 0.21 0.15 0.2 0.68 0.42 0.43 0.23
Instruments: respect for others and responsibility.
Robust p values in brackets. **signiﬁcant 1%; * at 5%.
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tained. As with the concern of endogeneity between institutions and economic outcomes, it
is possible that respect for others and responsibility are jointly determined with output per
worker, productivity, or capital. Well-educated, productive people in prosperous countries
might ﬁnd it easier to be respectful and responsible. Causality might go, in part, the wrong
way. If so, the coeﬃcient estimates and standard errors reported in Tables 3 and 4 are
biased.
One way to address both of these criticisms is to introduce the other values from the
World Values Survey (2006) into our regressions. The inclusion of other values addresses
the possibility of omitted values directly. Including additional values can handle concerns
of potential endogeneity as well. Our reasoning is as follows. If productivity, education,
and prosperity lead to citizens with better values, then any of the values from the World
Values Survey (2006) should perform more or less equally in the kinds of regressions in
Table 3. That is, determination and hard work, along with thrift and unselﬁshness and
independence, are all the sorts of qualities that people in rich countries would be expected
to hold, if the endogeneity argument were true.
To implement this approach, we estimate equation (3), but include, one by one, each
of the other eight values from the list described in Section 3.1.19 Our results are shown
in Table 8, Panels A, B, C, and D. The ﬁrst column shows the coeﬃcient and p-value for
the newly added value (e.g. independence in Row 1); the second column shows the same
information for respect ; and the third column for responsibility.20 None of the other values
respond in a manner consistent with the endogeneity hypothesis: in only one case (hard
work for h) does the added value have both signiﬁcance and the expected positive sign.
Our two core values, on the other hand, retain the pattern observed earlier. Respect is
signiﬁcant and large in magnitude in every regression in the panels for A and y. Respon-
sibility is signiﬁcant and large in the regressions for kρ, h and y. We take these results to
mean that that (a) our earlier results were not driven by the omission of other important
values; and (b) that our two core values are not endogenous.
7 Conclusion
This paper continues recent work on the search for deep determinants of economic growth
and development. We show that two core values  respect for others and responsibility 
are highly correlated with productivity, capital, human capital, and output per worker. We
suggest that these core values are fundamental and exogenous, and work both directly on
19 We exclude good manners from the list because it was not asked in sixteen countries in our sample.
20In all speciﬁcations, the number of observations was either 55 or 56. We do not report the coeﬃcients
or p-values for Property Rights or the constant, but both were generally positive and signiﬁcant.
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Table 8: Added Values
Panel A: Dependent = A Panel B: Dependent = kρ
Added Value _ Added Respect Resp Added Respect Resp
independence -0.03 1.59** 0.2 0.02 0.33 0.72*
[0.94] [0.00] [0.72] [0.88] [0.18] [0.01]
hard work -0.74** 1.10* -0.21 0.05 0.36 0.75**
[0.00] [0.03] [0.65] [0.70] [0.13] [0.01]
perseverance 0.02 1.83** 0.26 -0.32 0.47+ 0.76**
[0.96] [0.00] [0.63] [0.23] [0.10] [0.01]
thrift -0.68+ 1.35* 0.37 0.31 0.43 0.64*
[0.09] [0.01] [0.47] [0.19] [0.14] [0.01]
imagination -0.55 1.59** 0.18 -0.15 0.33 0.78*
[0.44] [0.00] [0.75] [0.66] [0.18] [0.01]
religious faith -0.46+ 1.49** -0.15 -0.2 0.18 0.59*
[0.09] [0.01] [0.76] [0.23] [0.55] [0.02]
unselﬁshness 0.27 1.46* 0.26 0.07 0.3 0.74**
[0.46] [0.01] [0.63] [0.69] [0.24] [0.01]
obedience -0.29 1.60** 0.05 -0.48* 0.34 0.49*
[0.44] [0.00] [0.93] [0.04] [0.16] [0.03]
Panel C: Dependent = h Panel D: Dependent = y
independence -0.03 0.00 0.41** -0.04 1.91** 1.33*
[0.68] [0.98] [0.00] [0.91] [0.00] [0.05]
hard work 0.14* 0.09 0.48** -0.55* 1.55* 1.02+
[0.02] [0.56] [0.00] [0.04] [0.01] [0.08]
perseverance -0.13 0.19 0.46** -0.25 2.49** 1.48*
[0.37] [0.27] [0.00] [0.65] [0.00] [0.03]
thrift -0.08 -0.03 0.42** -0.45 1.76* 1.43*
[0.49] [0.85] [0.00] [0.45] [0.02] [0.03]
imagination -0.44** 0.00 0.45** -1.31+ 1.91** 1.40+
[0.01] [0.99] [0.00] [0.09] [0.00] [0.06]
religious faith -0.02 -0.01 0.39** -0.68* 1.65** 0.82
[0.79] [0.94] [0.00] [0.02] [0.01] [0.19]
unselﬁshness -0.11 0.05 0.37** 0.22 1.81* 1.37*
[0.36] [0.78] [0.01] [0.59] [0.01] [0.04]
obedience 0.05 0.00 0.42** -0.73 1.93** 0.96
[0.64] [0.98] [0.00] [0.18] [0.00] [0.13]
Property rights and a constant included. ** signiﬁcant at 1%; * at 5%; + at 10%.
21
behavior and indirectly through institutions. Our empirical results are strong and consis-
tently support our contention.
In OLS regressions, we showed that respect for others and responsibility were almost
always highly signiﬁcant and of sizeable magnitude. Respect for others works through
productivity and responsibility works through physical and human capital accumulation.
We also showed that the popular measure of trust performed very poorly when it was
paired with our core values. Next, we investigated whether the presence of core values
could mitigate or eliminate the negative eﬀects of societal divisions on inputs to production.
The societal division variable we considered was ethnic fractionalization. We found that
without the inclusion of core values, ethnic fractionalization was signiﬁcant and negatively
correlated with productivity, capital intensity, and output per worker. When we included
the core values, however, ethnic fractionalization was no longer statistically signiﬁcant. We
take this as evidence supporting our claim that good values can overcome the detrimental
eﬀects of societal divisions on production. Countries that are more highly fractious than
others need not have lower standards of living. The core values they uphold may be more
important.
We also examined whether social infrastructure (as measured by Hall and Jones, 1999)
and the other institutional measures  index of economic freedom, property rights, and civil
liberties  embed core values. In all of our OLS speciﬁcations, both core values respect for
others and responsibility were positively and strongly correlated with better institutions.
We then considered the possibility that values inﬂuence productivity, human and physical
capital, and output per worker only through institutions, and not directly. Under this
hypothesis and the assumption that institutions are endogenous to economic outcomes, our
core values become instruments for institutions. In this set-up, we found consistent support
that institutions aﬀect the components of production.
Lastly, we consider other individual values that might be taught to children that may be
thought important to accumulation and productivity. When we include these other values
in our speciﬁcation, one at a time against our core values, the statistical signiﬁcance of our
core values did not change and the other values were rarely signiﬁcant (with the expected
sign). We take this as strong evidence that respect for others and responsibility are key
factors in the determination of output per worker and that core values are exogenous.
Underdevelopment is persistent. Various theories have been advanced about why this
is the case. If core values are the key to economic success, then persistence may reﬂect
the diﬃculty in changing the fundamental principles by which citizens behave and interact.
Values matter.
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